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Note
Licensing Liability: Responding to Judicial
Expansion of Antitrust Enforcement in North
Carolina Dental
Lesley E. Roe
INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2017, Dr. Chet Evans wrote an open letter
to members of the podiatric profession and state policymakers,
threatening to resign from his position as chair of the Florida
Board of Podiatric Medicine unless the State agreed to indemnify him and others similarly situated against personal liability
for the actions of the board.1 This letter followed a letter from
members of the board addressed to Governor Rick Scott, written
a month earlier.2 On February 3, 2017, Dr. Evans made good on
his promise and submitted his resignation, as did fellow board
member Dr. Scott Koppel.3
These events occurred in the wake of North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, a 2015 Supreme Court decision greatly expanding the antitrust liability of state licensing
boards.4 In a six to three decision, the Court held that state

 J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Professor Daniel Schwarcz for his expertise and thoughtful comments throughout this process. I would also like to thank The Center of State Enforcement of
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws for valuable insight in selecting this
topic, especially Professor Prentiss Cox, Chairman Kevin O’Connor, and Executive Director Steve Houck. Thanks also to the editors and staff members of
Minnesota Law Review for their work on this Note and all of Volume 103, with
special thanks to Frances Fink, David Hahn, and Joshua Davis for editorial
contributions. Copyright  2018 by Lesley E. Roe.
1. Chet Evans, Podiatric Medical Board Volunteers Nationwide NOT Immune to Lawsuit: An Open Letter to the Podiatric Profession, PODIATRY MGMT.
ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2017), http://podiatrym.com/search3.cfm?id=98854.
2. FLA. BD. OF PODIATRIC MED., MEETING MINUTES 7 (2017), http://
floridaspodiatricmedicine.gov/meetings/minutes/2017/02-february/020317
-minutes.pdf (discussing the letter to Governor Scott).
3. Id.
4. 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
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boards may be subject to antitrust liability for actions that restrain competition, if a controlling number of board members are
active market participants, and if the board is not adequately
supervised by the state.5 Prior to North Carolina Dental, many
boards assumed that, as agents of the state, licensing boards
were immune to antitrust liability, regardless of the board’s composition.6
North Carolina Dental’s effect on the Florida Board of Podiatric Medicine was hardly unique. The daily operations of thousands of occupational regulatory boards across the country were
thrown into a state of uncertain legal status when the Supreme
Court’s decision was announced.7 On average, each state has
about thirty-nine licensing boards.8 After North Carolina Dental, each board became a substantial liability risk to the state,
almost overnight.
Many states scrambled to mitigate the legal exposure North
Carolina Dental created.9 In Florida, a bill was introduced in
5. Id. at 1117.
6. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 15-402, at 2 (2015) (“Before North Carolina Dental was decided, most state licensing boards operated under the assumption that they were protected from antitrust suits under the state action
immunity doctrine.”).
7. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2017) (noting that there
are 1790 occupational licensing boards across the country).
8. Id.
9. Some states responded to the decision by first seeking guidance through
the state attorney general’s office. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6;
Idaho Exec. Order No. 16-01 (Jan. 13, 2016); Letter from Pam Bondi, Fla. State
Att’y Gen., to Andy Gardiner, President of the Fla. State Senate (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://media.nasba.org/files/2015/12/Florida-Attorney-General-Letter-to
-Legislature.pdf. Others took executive action through the office of the governor.
See Del. Exec. Order No. 60 (2016) (establishing a Professional Licensing Review Committee by executive action in a direct response to North Carolina Dental); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-33 (2015) (mandating that all non-rulemaking
actions of state boards comprised of a majority of market participants are subject to review by the Oklahoma Office of the Attorney General); see also Ala.
Exec. Order No. 7 (2011) (disbanding occupational boards through executive action with a stated purpose of “creating a competitive business environment,”
noting that the regulatory burden imposed by the board was no longer necessary). While issued several years before North Carolina Dental, the Alabama
Executive Order demonstrates an important role that governors’ offices may
play by disassembling unnecessary boards without going through legislative repeal. Ala. Exec. Order No. 7. Still other states attempted legislative action in
response to the increased litigation risk facing licensing boards. See, e.g., H.B.
2501, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016) (establishing a system to review rules
issued by health profession regulatory boards for potential anticompetitive effects); S. Con. Res. 65, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (establishing a Task
Force on Meaningful Oversight to evaluate whether Louisiana’s current
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January of 2017 seeking to indemnify individual board members
against antitrust liability.10 This action evidently came too late
for Drs. Evans and Koppel. While their resignations are among
the most drastic individual responses to North Carolina Dental,
the threat facing the doctors was far from illusory. At the time
the doctors resigned, at least three cases citing North Carolina
Dental had been filed in Florida;11 additionally, the State Attorney General’s Office had advised state boards that “there is no
coverage of defense costs, damages or attorney fee awards in the
event a Board Member is sued for [an] Antitrust Violation.”12 Because federal antitrust statutes provide for treble damages, the
Florida Attorney General opined that damages following from
antitrust liability may constitute punitive damages, placing
them in a category not covered by Florida’s indemnification
scheme.13 The absence of indemnification, the frequent marketsensitive decisions that make up the board’s core functions, and
automatic treble damages under the Sherman Act combined to
create a high disincentive for the two doctors to continue their
volunteer service on the Florida Board of Podiatric Medicine,

healthcare licensing system complies with North Carolina Dental); S.B. 2, 90th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (providing for legislative review of agency
action including board action); H.B. 1007, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.
2015) (amending occupational licensing board statutes in response to North
Carolina Dental).
10. S.B. 582, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
11. Ramos v. Tomasino, No. 16-CV-80681, 2016 WL 8678546, at *1, *3 n.3
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016), aff ’ d in relevant part, 701 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir.
2017) (dismissing antitrust claims of disbarred attorney against Florida State
Bar and holding that the State Bar is an “arm[ ] of the State” and therefore
North Carolina Dental does not apply); Rosenberg v. Florida, No. 15-22113-CIV,
2015 WL 13653967, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2015) (dismissing antitrust claims
against Florida State Bar filed by attorney suspended from practice of law for
one year and holding that North Carolina Dental does not apply “because The
Florida Bar is an arm of the state (a sovereign entity)—not a non-sovereign actor that is authorized by the State to regulate its own profession”); Baker Cty.
Med. Servs., Inc. v. State, 178 So. 3d 71, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing
antitrust liability of state’s agency for Healthcare Administration when it exceeded its authority in extending a certificate of need to a corporation, even
though antitrust was not among the claims brought by plaintiffs).
12. FLA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., US SUPREME COURT RULING IN NORTH
CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS V. FTC: OVERVIEW, IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 38 (2016), http://www
.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/re/documents/FREAB%20Meeting%20Documents/
2016/0416GM/0416FREABAntiTrust.pdf.
13. Id.
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notwithstanding the corrective legislation introduced in the
State Senate.14
Ultimately, the Florida bill died in committee after reaching
the House.15 As a result, members of licensing boards across all
occupations in Florida are exposed to the same personal liability
risk that drove Dr. Evans out of a board position he held for
seven years. The practical issues raised by North Carolina Dental are particularly acute in Florida, where the existing indemnification scheme for lawsuits brought against public actors in
their official capacity has an unclear application to antitrust litigation.16 However, the increased liability of licensing boards affects regulators of every profession across every state in the
country.
This Note will discuss several legislative and state executive-level responses to North Carolina Dental, and conclude by
recommending a legislative partnership between states and the
federal government, intended to address both the litigation risk
facing licensing boards, as well as the legitimate economic concerns informing the Court’s 2015 decision. Part I will lay the
groundwork for this ultimate recommendation by discussing the
role of occupational licensing in the United States, the legal environment of boards before and after North Carolina Dental, and
state and federal legislative responses to the Court’s decision.
Part II will argue that the liability risk states now bear under
North Carolina Dental is so great that a legislative response is
necessary, but that neither state nor federal responses to date
are sufficient to address the legal predicament facing licensing
boards. Part III will draw from existing legislative responses, as
well as current scholarship on state board liability, to outline key
elements of cooperative legislation capitalizing on the strengths
of both the federal and state levels, while avoiding the pitfalls
that make legislation at either level insufficient on its own.

14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
15. Bill History, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/
00582/?Tab=BillHistory (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
16. FLA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., supra note 12 (“Risk Management advises that there is no coverage of defense costs, damages or attorney fee awards
in the event a Board Member is sued for Antitrust Violation.”).
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I. NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL AND REACTIONARY
RESCUE LEGISLATION
This Part provides an overview of the major governmental
systems and legal doctrines implicated by North Carolina Dental
and the legislation that has followed the Court’s 2015 decision.
Section A discusses state licensing boards as public-private actors, acting with delegated authority from the state, but comprised primarily of private actors. Section B describes the scope
of occupational licensing boards and the role they play in regulating service economies. Section B also identifies competing interests shaping the debate over whether licensure helps or
harms consumers. Section C provides a brief history of state action immunity—a longstanding facet of the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence which holds that states are sovereign actors, not subject to federal antitrust laws. Section C describes the
intersection of North Carolina Dental and state action immunity, and outlines the dilemma now facing state licensing
boards—charged with making market sensitive decisions to protect consumers, but bearing potential antitrust liability for their
actions. Section D outlines federal and state legislative responses to North Carolina Dental, designed to help resolve this
dilemma. Finally, Section E provides an overview of the Restoring Board Immunity Act of 2017,17 which is a federal bill introduced in response to North Carolina Dental.
A. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARDS: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
Occupational licensing has a long history in the United
States, and has historically been a state, rather than federal, issue.18 In 2015, there were 1790 state licensing boards in the
United States, all of which were created by statute and charged
with regulatory responsibilities.19 The California Board of Psy-

17. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1649, 115th Cong. (2017).
18. See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1923) (upholding licensing requirement for practice of dentistry); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123 (1889) (upholding a West Virginia statute prohibiting the unlicensed
practice of medicine).
19. See Allensworth, supra note 7 (reporting 1790 state licensing boards
created by statute in her fifty-state survey).
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chology, for example, is authorized by California’s Psychology Licensing Law.20 Similarly, the Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners is established by the Minnesota Medical Practice Act.21
This statutory authorization and delegation of legislative power
mirrors the creation of traditional state agencies.
Licensing boards resemble traditional state agencies in several respects. For example, the North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners (the Board) is created by statute and labeled
as a state agency.22 The Board is statutorily charged with creating, administering, and enforcing the State’s licensing system.23
As a State agency, the Board is subject to North Carolina’s Administrative Procedure Act, § 150B–1 et seq.24 In all these ways,
the Board is similar to a traditional state agency. While the
North Carolina Board is not necessarily representative of all occupational licensing boards, preliminary research suggests that
it is not unreasonable to use the specific example of the North
Carolina Board as a proxy for conceptualizing the statutory characteristics of many occupational licensing boards across the
country.25
State licensing boards are unlike traditional state agencies,
however, in that they are generally comprised of private parties,
rather than full-time employees of the state. The vast majority
of occupational boards are made up at least in part of industry
insiders.26 This is a common practice because industry insiders
often have a great deal of experience in the regulation of their
profession, and for this reason are uniquely qualified to serve on
occupational licensing boards.27 In addition, industry insiders
20. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900–2996.6 (West 1968).
21. MINN. STAT. §§ 147.01–.37 (2017).
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (2017). For an example of how the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice is similarly classified as a state agency, see
also ROBERT A. LEACH, MINN. BD. OF MED. PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN COMPLIANCE WITH MINNESOTA STATUTES SECTION 3D.06 (SUNSET REVIEW) 2 (2012).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-29 to 90-41 (2017).
24. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015).
25. The review of state boards and their authorizing statutes conducted in
the course of this research has not produced any substantial deviations from the
general pattern of (1) state authorization; (2) delegation of legislative authority
for a public purpose; and (3) applicability of administrative statutes to the board
in question.
26. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1570 (discussing how eighty-five percent
of licensing boards in 2017 were statutorily required to be made up of active
market participants).
27. See Occupational Licensing: Regulation and Licensing: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law Before the
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are more able and willing to volunteer their time for government
service, or to accept lower compensation than academic experts
not otherwise employed.28 This results in a lower cost to state
governments.29
Because licensing boards are created by statute and perform
regulatory functions with authority delegated by the state legislature, but are comprised primarily of private actors, these
boards may be considered public-private partnerships. State licensing boards stand alongside a growing number of public-private partnerships that exist in both the federal and state regulatory spheres.30 The public-private nature of the Board was
central to the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Dental.31 The Court took pains to underscore the perverse incentives
that may drive boards “dominated” by market participants to
reach anticompetitive regulatory decisions.32 North Carolina
Dental joins a catalog of cases in which the Supreme Court has

H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2017) [hereinafter Hearing on Occupational Licensing] (written statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen, Senior Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Unit, Office of the Virginia Att’y Gen.), https://docs
.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20170912/106382/HHRG-115-JU05-Wstate
-AllenS-20170912.pdf (noting the market expertise that active practitioners
bring to licensing boards). Justice Breyer observed at oral argument that brain
surgeons are better positioned to decide “who can practice brain surgery in this
State” than “a group of bureaucrats.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, N.C.
Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/13-534_l6h1.pdf. But see Allensworth,
supra note 7, at 1570 (“[S]elf-regulation may allow for expertise in decision making, but it comes at a very high price in the form of professional self-dealing.”).
28. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 5 (written
statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (noting the high cost of removing market
participants from all state regulatory boards because “most market-participant
board members are unpaid”).
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2000) (discussing the role of
non-government actors in the exercise of administrative authority); Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 376–79, 469–70 (2004) (heralding
new public/private partnerships as the new frontier in administrative law); see
also DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015) (discussing the
constitutionality of Amtrak, a paradigm of public/private partnerships in the
modern administrative state, in which Congress vested public standard setting
authority in Amtrak, while simultaneously designating Amtrak as a private,
non-governmental corporation).
31. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1105 (“Limits on state-action immunity are
most essential when the State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active
market participants.”).
32. Id. at 1106.
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taken issue with the legality of private or partially-private institutions exercising public regulatory power.33 The dual nature of
the Board was a key contributor to the Court’s finding of illegality, and this feature of licensing boards should not be overlooked.
B. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
CURRENT CRITICISMS
Occupational licensing boards exist in every state, and are
responsible for regulating hundreds of professions across the
country.34 Professional licensing has grown dramatically in recent decades.35 This increase has been driven in part by the expansion of the service economy,36 as an increasing number of
boards are commissioned to protect consumer welfare.37 As licensing has proliferated the U.S. economy, professional licensing
boards have not been without their critics—which hail from both
political and academic spheres.
1. Historical Background and Current Scope of Occupational
Licensing Boards
In 2017, there were 1790 state occupational licensing boards
in the United States.38 These boards engage in a variety of activities, including: sanctioning practitioners; responding to con-

33. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1232 (analyzing the status of
Amtrak considering its pseudo-private status and regulatory powers); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936) (noting that the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1934 may be unconstitutional for delegating legislative
power to private parties); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935) (striking down delegation of regulatory power to private
parties).
34. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC
STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1 (2015) [hereinafter FTC STAFF GUIDANCE].
35. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of
Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 677, 678 (2010).
36. In 2006, seventy-seven percent of jobs in the U.S. economy were in the
service sector. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Industry Output
and Employment Projections to 2018: Table 2.1. Employment by Major Industry
Sector, 2006, 2016, and Projected 2026, MONTHLY LAB. REV., http://www.bls
.gov/emp/ep_table_201.htm (last modified Oct. 24, 2017). This same report
found that twenty-nine of the thirty fastest growing jobs were located in the
service sector. Id.
37. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 147.001 (2017) (“The primary responsibility and
obligation of the Board of Medical Practice is to protect the public.”).
38. Allensworth, supra note 7.
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sumer complaints; prohibiting deceptive advertising; and circulating industry information to the public.39 However, boards’
most relevant function for purposes of this discussion is licensure, or determining who may act as a provider in a regulated
market. Medicine and law are examples of professions that have
traditionally required licensure.40 As state economies and service industries have grown, so too has occupational licensing. In
2015, over 800 distinct occupations in the United States required
practitioners to be licensed.41 Regulated occupations range from
cosmetologists to interior designers.42 Approximately one in four
U.S. workers required a license to perform their chosen occupation in 2015; in the 1950s, that rate was just one in twenty.43
2. Criticisms of Occupational Licensing
Critics of occupational licensing argue that licensing boards
overstep their intended purpose of providing for consumer
health and welfare, and insulate economic incumbents by keeping would-be competitors out of the market.44 Critics point out
that state governments derive some financial benefit by collecting licensure fees.45 Additionally, regulated professionals and

39. See ABRAHAM L. WICKELGREN, RESPONDING TO THE NORTH CAROLINA
DENTAL DECISION: A PRIMER FOR STATE REGULATORY BOARD COUNSEL AND
BOARD SUPERVISORS 19–22 (2017) (identifying functions of regulatory boards
other than licensing that may carry varying degrees of antitrust liability).
40. See FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34. But see Allensworth, supra
note 7, at 1570 (suggesting that traditionally licensed occupations like law and
medicine are “inefficiently regulated in ways that increase wages without addressing quality,” and as a result, licensure schemes in these professions should
be subjected to scrutiny).
41. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34 (citing Aaron Edlin & Rebecca
Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust
Scrutiny, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014)).
42. Id.
43. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 35.
44. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27 (testimony of
Robert Everett Johnson, Att’y, Institute for Justice).
45. See Gerald S. Kerska, Economic Protectionism and Occupational Licensing Reform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1703, 1741 (2017) (citing State Tax Collection
Sources 2000–2013, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/
state-tax-collection-sources-2000-2013 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018)). But see
MINN. STAT. § 214.06 (2017) (authorizing licensing boards, other than for
health-related occupations, to collect sufficient relicensing fees to cover the
board’s anticipated expenditures, and not more).
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trade associations have a powerful voice in lobbying state governments to implement and sustain licensure requirements.46
Critics of occupational licensing hail from both sides of the
political aisle. In 2015, the Obama Administration issued a report outlining the economic harms of occupational regulation.47
In 2017, federal legislation denouncing occupational board overregulation was introduced by a slate of Republican lawmakers.48
Advocates for licensing reform can be found in the federal government,49 academia,50 and the media.51 According to the Federal Trade Commission, “Unnecessary licensing restrictions
erect significant barriers and impose costs that cause real harm
to American workers, employers, consumers and our economy as
a whole, with no measurable benefits to consumers or society.”52
46. See Kerska, supra note 45, at 1724–25 (discussing the motivations and
impacts of economic incumbents lobbying lawmakers to maintain high barriers
to entry).
47. Compare OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_
nonembargo.pdf, with the policy of least-restrictive alternatives to licensing and
the anti-licensure rhetoric in the Restoring Board Immunity Act, sponsored by
Republican Congressmen. Restoring Board Immunity Act of 2017, H.R. 3446,
115th Cong. (2017). In the House of Representatives, the bill is sponsored by
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), and co-sponsored by Representative Tim
Walberg (R-MI). H.R. 3446-RBI Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3446/cosponsors (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). In
the Senate, the bill is sponsored by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) and co-sponsored
by Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Ben Sasse (R-NE). S. 1649-RBI Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1649/
cosponsors (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
48. See supra note 47. The bill is intended to “help States combat abuse of
occupational licensing laws by economic incumbents.” H.R. 3446; see also S.
1649, 115th Cong. (2017).
49. See License to Compete: Occupational Licensing and the State Action
Doctrine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (written
statement of the Federal Trade Commission).
50. See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 7.
51. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Moving to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a
License, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/
business/economy/job-licenses.html; Josh Zumbrun, Occupational Licenses May
Be Bad for the Economy, But Good for Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational
-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-economy-but-good-for-workers-who-have-them.
52. Economic Liberty: Opening Doors to Opportunity, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty (last visited Oct. 14,
2018); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF POLICY PAPER, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES (2014) (advocating for avoidance of unnecessary regulation);
Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Daniel E. Shearouse,
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In 2015, the Obama Administration issued a report finding that
unnecessary licensing requirements “raise the price of goods and
services, restrict employment opportunities, and make it more
difficult for workers to take their skills across state lines.”53 Special interest groups including the Institute for Justice,54 the Heritage Foundation,55 the Brookings Institution,56 and Reason
Foundation57 all advocate for reducing occupational licensing requirements.
Critics have challenged occupational licensing as an unconstitutional restriction of free speech,58 as a due process violation,
and as denial of equal protection under the law.59 Licensing laws
are criticized as disproportionately burdening military families,60 and people in low-paying jobs.61 Licensing has also been
Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of S.C. (Apr. 15, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-and-department-justice
-comment-south-carolina-supreme-court-concerning-proposed-guidelines/
v080010sc.pdf (describing their comment before the South Carolina Supreme
Court concerning proposed guidelines for residential and commercial real estate
closings).
53. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 47, at
3.
54. Paul Avelar & Nick Sibilla, Untangling Regulations, INST. FOR JUST.,
http://ij.org/report/untangling-regulations (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Ari Bargil, Florida’s Dirty Dozen, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/floridas-dirty
-dozen (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Dick M. Carpenter, II et al., License to Work,
INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/license-work-2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018);
Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/pillar/economic-liberty/?post_
type=case (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Entrepreneurial Survival Guide, INST.
FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/entrepreneurs-survival-guide (last visited Oct. 14,
2018).
55. James Sherk, Creating Opportunity in the Workplace, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/
creating-opportunity-the-workplace.
56. MORRIS M. KLEINER, HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING POLICIES (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf.
57. ADAM B. SUMMERS, REASON FOUND., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:
RANKING THE STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES (2007), https://reason.org/
wp-content/uploads/files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf.
58. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Del Castillo v.
Philip, No. 3:17-cv-00722 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (challenging restriction of
plaintiff ’ s freedom to provide dietary advice on free speech grounds).
59. See Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152 (D. Conn. 2014), aff ’ d
sub nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F. 3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015) (challenging restriction on non-dentist teeth whitening services as a deprivation of
the due process right to engage in a lawful profession).
60. See Kerska, supra note 45, at 1707–08.
61. See Dick M. Carpenter, II et al., The Occupations, INST. FOR JUST.,
http://ij.org/report/license-to-work/the-occupations (last visited Oct. 14, 2018)
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accused of perpetuating and steepening income inequality in the
United States.62 Beyond these arguments that licensing laws
create economic victims, many argue that licensing laws hurt the
economy as a whole. Economists estimate that occupational licensing costs consumers between $116 and $139 billion annually
in the form of higher-priced services.63 The economic, constitutional, and social-policy based criticisms of occupational licensing make clear that, regardless of the intentions of state licensing, the effects are more far-reaching than merely protecting
consumers.
C. NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL AND A NEW ERA OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT
Prior to North Carolina Dental, the majority view was that
occupational regulatory boards, as state agencies, were immune
from antitrust liability under the state action immunity doctrine.64 In North Carolina Dental, however, the Supreme Court
held that occupational licensing boards controlled by market
participants are not entitled to state action immunity because
members have a strong incentive to act in their own interest rather than in the public interest.65 This Section describes the genesis and evolution of the state action immunity doctrine, then
explains how North Carolina Dental built on that doctrine to
change antitrust liability facing “hybrid” state actors, or arms of
the state controlled in part by private persons.

(noting the prevalence of licensing requirements in low- and moderate-income
occupations).
62. See Jonathan Rothwell, Myths of the 1 Percent: What Puts People at the
Top, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/upshot/
income-inequality-united-states.html.
63. MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 115 (2006).
64. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (suggesting that traditional state agencies are likely immune to antitrust challenges, because the
Court held that the Commission’s execution of a statutory prorate program was
entitled to state action immunity). But see Edlin & Haw, supra note 41 (questioning status of immunity prior to North Carolina Dental).
65. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105–06
(2015).

2018]

LICENSING LIABILITY

437

1. An Overview of the State Action Immunity Doctrine Prior
to North Carolina Dental
Federal antitrust law is intended to encourage competition
and preserve free markets by strongly disincentivizing anticompetitive conduct.66 However, the Supreme Court has held that
states acting in their sovereign capacities are entitled to restrain
competition if doing so furthers other public goals.67 This doctrine is known as state action immunity. Many commentators
view the development of state action immunity as a necessary
restriction on the reach of federal antitrust law.68 After the New
Deal Era expansion of the Commerce Clause, the reach of the
federal government to regulate intrastate matters increased dramatically.69 This in turn expanded the application of federal antitrust statutes like the Sherman Act far beyond the expectations of the enacting Congress, which could not have anticipated
that federal antitrust law would be used to prosecute state-level
officials.70
The Supreme Court introduced the concept of state action
immunity in the 1943 case Parker v. Brown.71 In this case, a California raisin producer challenged a state statute authorizing a
program controlling marketing of the raisin crop.72 The statute
at issue authorized programs to restrict competition among
growers and maintain prices in order to serve a public goal other
than competition—specifically, to “conserve the agricultural
wealth of the State.”73 The plaintiff-raisin producer challenged
the validity of the program on several grounds, including the

66. See id. at 1109 (“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the
Nation’s free market structures . . . . The antitrust laws declare a considered
and decisive prohibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing, and
other combinations or practices that undermine the free market.”).
67. Id. (holding that state legislatures may “impose restrictions on occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise limit
competition to achieve public objectives”); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (holding that “the States possess a significant measure of
sovereignty” and are thus entitled to enact legislation that restrains competition in order to further public ends).
68. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA.
L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2016).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
72. Id. at 344.
73. Id. at 346.
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Sherman Act.74 If the marketing program had been an agreement between private persons, the program would have violated
the Sherman Act.75 However, because the program was organized under state law, no antitrust liability attached. The Court
explained, “We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.”76 The Court held that the Sherman Act is intended to
govern individual private action, and not state action. Thus, the
state action immunity doctrine was born.
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of state action immunity in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, decided in 1980.77 Here, the Court addressed the applicability of state action immunity to programs in which the
state government is a passive facilitator, rather than an active
administrator.78 The state government in Midcal was passive in
the sense that, although the state legislature consented to a specific regulatory scheme, the scheme was ultimately administered
by private parties without state oversight.79 Under California’s
price maintenance statutes for wholesale wine trade, wine producers and wholesalers were required to file contracts with the
state.80 These contracts governed the price at which wholesalers
were permitted to sell producers’ wines to individual merchants.81 If no contract existed, wholesalers filed a price schedule.82 Schedules and contracts for each producer’s wines were
binding on all wholesalers in the defined trading area.83 The
State of California exerted no control over wine prices, and did
not review the reasonableness of the filed contracts or price
schedules.84
As in Parker, the Court held that California’s statutory
scheme for fixing wholesale wine prices would plainly violate the

74.
75.
76.
77.
(1980).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 350–51.
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99‒100.
Id.

2018]

LICENSING LIABILITY

439

Sherman Act if it were organized by private parties.85 Next, the
Court moved to consider “whether the State’s involvement in the
price-setting program [was] sufficient to establish antitrust immunity under Parker.”86 To answer this question, Midcal laid
down a two-part test.87 First, there must be a “clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed” state policy intending to displace
competition.88 Second, the state must actively supervise the actor charged with executing the policy.89
The Court held that the wine pricing scheme met the first
prong but failed the second, and as a result was not entitled to
antitrust immunity.90 The Court found insufficient evidence of
active state supervision, noting that the state did “not monitor
market conditions,” engage in examination of the statutory program, or regulate the terms of the contracts or price schedules.91
The fact that the price fixing scheme was statutorily endorsed
by the state did not excuse the fact that it was principally a private agreement which had received the blessing of the California
State legislature.92 In the absence of active state supervision, the
Court held, “The national policy in favor of competition cannot
be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”93
Finally, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court
considered the applicability of state action immunity to municipalities.94 The Court held that cities are unlike private persons

85. Id. at 103.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 105.
88. Id. (internal citations omitted). In most antitrust claims against state
licensing boards, Midcal’s first prong will be easily met, and litigation will hinge
primarily on whether the active supervision requirement is fulfilled. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1584 (“Boards typically meet the ‘clear articulation’
prong easily; courts have held that the ubiquitous statutory language giving
licensing boards the authority to create professional entry and practice requirements suffices.” (citing Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d
272, 275–76 (9th Cir. 1982))). For a more robust discussion of Midcal’s first
prong, see FTC v. Pheobe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1013
(2013), holding that the clear articulation requirement is satisfied where “the
displacement of competition [is] the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the
exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature.”
89. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 105–06.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 106.
94. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
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seeking state sanctioning of otherwise anticompetitive agreements, like the producers and wholesalers in Midcal, because
cities are public institutions unlikely to have self-interested motivations in issuing these regulations.95 However, cities do not
act with the sovereignty of the state legislature, and as such are
not entitled to Parker immunity.96 Attempting to chart a middle
ground, the Court held that cities are immune to antitrust challenges as long as they satisfy Midcal’s first prong—acting in accordance with a clearly articulated state policy.97 Hallie thus created a “shortcut” for public actors like cities, which lack the
sovereignty of the state legislature or state supreme court.98
2. State Action Immunity and Occupational Licensing Boards
After North Carolina Dental
Prior to North Carolina Dental, many states operated under
the assumption that licensing boards were immune to antitrust
liability under the state action doctrine of Parker, or at least
were subject only to the clear articulation requirement under
Hallie’s shortcut.99 However, in North Carolina Dental, the
Court found that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners
was more similar to a private group, like a trade association,
than a traditional state agency.100 In so holding, the Court specifically noted the inherent danger of market participant board
members acting in self-serving ways rather than in the public
interest.101 As a result, the Court held that the antitrust claim
facing the Board was subject to review under Midcal’s two-part

95. Id. at 47.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 46 (“The active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a municipality.”).
98. See Allensworth, supra note 68, at 1400 (describing Hallie’s “shortcut”).
99. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 4–5. But see Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579–81 (1984) (holding that an accountancy board limiting the number of new licenses to be issued could be subject to antitrust scrutiny
if the state supreme court did not have ultimate authority over the issue); Bates
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1977) (holding that a board controlled by attorneys was immune from antitrust concerns only because the
adopting regulations deterring attorneys from advertising or engaging in price
competition was ultimately the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision). Thus, while
many state occupational boards assumed that they were entitled to antitrust
immunity under the state action doctrine, there is ample Supreme Court case
law prior to North Carolina Dental suggesting that boards fully controlled by
market participants are not immune to antitrust challenges.
100. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015).
101. Id. at 1116‒17.
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test.102 The Court found that the Board failed to satisfy Midcal’s
active supervision requirement, and as a result had violated the
Sherman Act without the cover of state action immunity.103
Understanding the nuances and implications of the Court’s
holding in North Carolina Dental requires a brief review of the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Practicing dentists had complained to the Board that non-dentists were offering teeth whitening services at below-market rates.104 In response, the Board issued cease and desist letters to providers of
teeth whitening services acting without a dentistry license.105
The issuance of the cease and desist letters ultimately led to the
Board’s liability under the Sherman Act.106 The decision to issue
the cease and desist letters was not subject to review by the
state.107 In addition, the decision to issue cease and desist letters
rather than taking the non-dentist teeth whiteners to court
meant that the Board’s action was self-executing, in that it did
not require approval or ratification by any independent body in
order to be effective.108 The Board’s determination that the term
dentistry in its authorizing statute included the practice of teeth
whitening was similarly unsupervised by the State.109 Accordingly, once the Court decided that the Board was not subject to
Parker immunity or Hallie’s shortcut, but rather to Midcal’s twoprong test, the case had essentially been decided against the
Board.110
North Carolina Dental is problematic for state occupational
licensing boards for two main reasons: it creates a heavy liability
102. See id. at 1114 (“The Court holds today that a state board on which a
controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.”).
103. Id. at 1117.
104. Id. at 1108.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1108‒09.
107. Id.
108. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101
(No. 13-543) (raising the issue of self-executing board action in a question by
Justice Ginsburg, who stated, “[Y]ou can have such a board, but there needs to
be a check of supervision; that is, they can’t just go make their regulations without approval from some State entity and they can’t go around issuing cease and
desist orders. They have to come to a court . . . and the court would act as a
check”); see also WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 13 (noting that when a board
“enforces a statute on its own,” the action carries antitrust risk, but the board
is likely “immune if it asks the court to enforce the statute”).
109. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
110. Id. at 1105–06.
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risk, and is light on guidance regarding how to comply with the
legal framework it sets out.
First, antitrust suits are notoriously complex and expensive
to defend, not least of all because the Sherman Act awards automatic treble damages.111 Much of what occupational boards do in
terms of regulating service providers is subject to attack under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which provides, that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” is illegal.112 The legal exposure of the approximately 1790
occupational boards across the United States is therefore substantial.113
Second, the North Carolina Dental decision is ambiguous
and vague in several respects. The decision fails to define what
it means for a board to be “dominated” by market participants—
a condition the opinion suggests is necessary to trigger Midcal’s
two-pronged scrutiny.114 To this end, advisory opinions have
counseled states to understand any number of active market
participants on the board—even a single member—makes Parker’s automatic state action immunity unavailable.115
The North Carolina Dental decision is also ambiguous regarding the requirements of active state supervision, merely
stating that this is a context-dependent inquiry.116 The Court attempts by negative definition to sketch the shape of adequate
active supervision processes, explaining that the mere option to
veto board action is insufficient.117 Ultimately, however, there is
scarce guidance regarding how to fulfill Midcal’s second prong,
and it will be up to the lower courts to define what is necessary
through litigation.
On the issue of active state supervision, not only does North
Carolina Dental leave unresolved the question of which processes are required to constitute active supervision, it also fails
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). Justice Kennedy raised this same issue at
Oral Argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101
(No. 13-543) (“[I]f I were a private practitioner and . . . a neurologist came to me
and said, I think it’s important for us to do standards, can I get on this board? I
say, have no part of it. Triple damages, attorneys’ fees. You can’t even afford to
defend this case. Get off that board.”). Justice Breyer also raised the issue of
treble damages at Oral Argument. Id. at 31.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
113. Allensworth, supra note 7.
114. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106.
115. See WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 4.
116. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106–07.
117. Id. at 1107.
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to address the necessary composition of the supervising body.
Stated differently, North Carolina Dental provides little to no
instruction regarding how supervision ought to be achieved or
who should do the supervising.
On the issue of who should be doing the supervising, Midcal
dictates that immunity attaches where the supervising body acts
with the sovereign power of the state.118 It is unclear, however,
which state bodies act with sufficient state sovereignty, and
which do not. At oral argument, Justice Breyer used the term
“Stateness” to refer to the degree to which a given public body
has the sovereign properties of the state.119 To trigger state action immunity, the supervising body must act with sufficient
“Stateness” to transform the ruling of the board into the ruling
of the state.120 Where the line of sufficient “Stateness” lies is unsettled, and the Court has provided very little by way of guideposts to inform the analysis. State legislatures and state supreme courts plainly act with sufficient “Stateness.”121 However,
it is impractical to require the legislature or supreme court to
substantively review and affirmatively adopt every recommendation of each professional licensing board in the state. Authorizing a traditional state agency with no market participants to
review and adopt licensing board decisions is likely, but not certain, to carry sufficient “Stateness.”122 Hallie dictates that cities
do not act with sufficient “Stateness” absent a clearly articulated
policy to displace competition, but the sovereign status of state
bodies between a state legislature and supreme court on one
pole, and cities on the other, leaves much to be defined.123

118. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1980).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No.
13-534).
120. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103–04.
121. There is a general consensus that acts of state supreme courts and state
legislatures are sovereign state acts entitled to immunity. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 29, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534) (discussing that state
supreme courts and legislatures act on behalf of the state).
122. Allensworth, supra note 68, at 1435‒36 (“[T]he NC Dental [sic] Court’s
declaration can be read as indicating that an inherently captured board can no
longer bootstrap the supervision requirement by reporting to another version of
itself: a self-interested sub-state entity. That leaves two possible categories of
supervisors: sovereign branches of the state government or sub-state entities
that are not so self-interested as to need supervision themselves.”).
123. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38‒40 (1985).
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In sum, the ambiguities that follow from North Carolina
Dental are substantial. States have very little guidance regarding: (1) at what point boards are considered “dominated” by market participants; (2) the review processes necessary to constitute
“active supervision;” or (3) the composition of the state body responsible for supervision. The result is a confused and jumbled
area of the Court’s jurisprudence. The opaque nature of the law
can only encourage further litigation, ratcheting states’ liability
risk under North Carolina Dental ever higher.
D. STATE RESPONSES TO NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL
Many states acted quickly to address the newly recognized
antitrust liability facing regulatory boards under North Carolina
Dental. State responses aimed at fulfilling the active supervision
requirements of Midcal’s second prong have taken various
forms, including executive orders,124 state attorneys’ general
opinions,125 and legislation attempting to establish state action
immunity.126
Connecticut, for example, amended its existing statutes, effective 2016, to give the Commissioner of Consumer Protection
greater power over the boards overseen by the department.127
The authorizing statute was amended so that any licensing or
certification-related decision of the board with adverse consequences to a party is considered a recommendation, subject to
the commissioner’s final decision.128 Similar amendments were
made to authorizing statutes for boards under Connecticut’s Department of Education129 and the Department of Public
Health.130 Similarly, Georgia acted quickly to pass legislation
giving the governor supervisory power over decisions made by
occupational licensing boards across the state.131
Other states have central review offices currently in place
likely to satisfy Midcal’s requirement that board decisions are
124. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (cataloging executive orders
out of Delaware and Oklahoma).
125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (highlighting California, Florida, and Idaho as states responding with state attorneys’ general opinions).
126. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (taking note of legislative responses in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-7 (2017).
128. Id. § 21a-7(a)(1).
129. Id. § 10-153f(b).
130. Id. § 20-8a(g).
131. See Georgia Professional Regulation Reform Act, H.B. 952, 153d Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2016) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3).
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subject to active supervision. Colorado, for example, has a Division of Professions and Occupations (DPO), housed in the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA).132 DPO views
promoting competition in the Colorado business community as a
primary responsibility of the Office.133 DPO’s core functions are
licensing, regulation, and investigation of consumer complaints
across approximately fifty occupations.134 Outside of merely
overseeing licensing decisions, DPO helps to set a regulatory
agenda for the State, which in recent years has included: intensifying regulation and licensing requirements for the massage
industry in response to human trafficking violations;135 preventing diversion of controlled substances by healthcare practitioners, particularly in the face of the opioid epidemic;136 and relaxing licensure requirements for mental health practitioners in
response to a statewide labor shortage.137 DPO goes beyond
merely adding an additional layer of bureaucracy, giving board
licensure decisions the State’s rubber-stamped seal of approval.
Instead, DPO helps to unify regulatory and licensing efforts
across the state, and drives efficiencies by using common systems to recruit and license qualified practitioners, conduct investigations and inspections, communicate with and educate consumers and industry practitioners, and administer regulatory
programs.138
Similarly, California’s licensing boards are already centrally
housed within the Department of Consumer Affairs.139 In an
opinion letter issued just months after North Carolina Dental
was issued, California State Attorney General Kamala Harris
opined that California could comply with North Carolina Dental
with “minimal adjustments to procedures and outlooks” by using
“existing resources” to create “lines of active supervision . . . for
the boards’ most market-sensitive actions.”140

132. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-102 (2016) (creating the Division of Professions and Occupations).
133. COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, FY 2016/2017 ANNUAL REPORT 1‒2 (2017) (acknowledging competitive considerations).
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 8‒9.
137. Id. at 21.
138. See id. at 1‒2 (explaining the mission of the Division of Professions and
Occupations and its enacted initiatives).
139. Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 13.
140. Id.
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Existing state structures such as those in Connecticut, Colorado, and California, have the advantage of already being ingrained in state regulatory and licensure systems. Reliance on
these structures also has the benefit of preventing duplicative
regulation between state and federal governments.
E. THE RESTORING BOARD IMMUNITY ACT OF 2017: A FEDERAL
RESPONSE TO NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL
In addition to legislative responses from states, federal lawmakers also introduced legislation seeking to address the increased liability of state occupational boards. In July of 2017,
identical versions of the Restoring Board Immunity Act (RBI
Act) were introduced in the House and Senate.141 At the time of
this writing, both bills were pending in committee.142
The RBI Act outlines two paths to immunity for state licensing boards. States may either establish a “mechanism for meaningful active supervision of licensing boards by State officials” or
establish a “mechanism for meaningful judicial review of board
actions in the State courts.”143 Hereafter, these two paths to immunity will be referred to as “active supervision” and “judicial
review,” respectively. The bill mandates procedures that boards
making licensing decisions must follow.144 Other functions of
state occupational boards are not addressed by the RBI Act, and
the statute provides no means of obtaining antitrust immunity
for acts of the board not related to licensing.145
1. Obtaining Immunity via Active State Supervision
To gain immunity through active supervision, the following
elements must be met: First, the board must be acting pursuant
to a nonfrivolous interpretation of state law.146 This requirement
is largely equivalent to the “clearly articulated policy,” or the
first prong of Midcal.147 Second, the State must adopt a policy of
141. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1649, 115th Cong. (2017).
142. This information is still accurate as of September 4, 2018.
143. H.R. 3446 § 2(1).
144. Id. § 5.
145. Marketing plans like the one adopted in Midcal to control cost and supply, for example, do not implicate licensing, but do implicate antitrust concerns.
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980).
Restrictions on advertisements and inconsistent enforcement of occupational
regulations are other examples of anticompetitive actions boards may take that
are not related to licensing.
146. H.R. 3446 § 5(a)(1).
147. Id.
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using “less restrictive alternatives” to licensing whenever possible.148
a. Part One: State Implementation of Federal Policy
For boards to receive immunity under the RBI Act, a state
must adopt the RBI Act’s licensure policy.149 Under this policy,
less restrictive alternatives must be used in lieu of licensing
across all regulated professions, unless adoption of alternatives
will not suffice to protect consumers from “real, substantial
threats to public health, safety, or welfare.”150 The bill defines
less restrictive alternatives as “inspections, bonding or insurance requirements, registration, and voluntary certification.”151
In addition to substituting less restrictive alternatives
wherever health, safety, and welfare concerns allow, a state
must also adopt a policy of construing the authority of licensing
boards narrowly, covering only individuals selling “goods or services that are included explicitly in the statute or regulation.”152
Under this construction, the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners would have lacked power to regulate teeth whiteners,
because teeth whitening is not explicitly included in the statutory definition of dentistry.153
b. Part Two: State Implementation of Federal Legislation
To achieve immunity under the RBI Act, a state must enact
legislation providing for active supervision of all licensing decisions made by all occupational licensing boards.154 This entails
the establishment of an Office of Supervision of Occupational
Boards (Office) to review board licensing activity and audit for
compliance with the policy outlined above.155 To be enforceable,
board decisions must be affirmatively endorsed in writing by the
Office.156 The statute outlines with some detail the responsibili-

148. Id. § 3(5).
149. See id. § 4(b) (requiring states to perform the licensure policy obligations listed in sections five and six to receive immunity).
150. Id. § 5(a)(2).
151. Id. § 2(4).
152. Id. § 5(b)(3).
153. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).
154. H.R. 3446 § 5(c).
155. Id. § 5(c)(2)(A).
156. Id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(i).
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ties of the Office, its interaction with state boards, and its composition.157 In addition, a state must review all existing occupational regulations for compliance with the policy outlined
above.158 Over a five-year period, a state must determine
whether any currently existing licensing requirements may be
replaced with less restrictive alternatives.159
2. Obtaining Immunity via Judicial Review
The path to immunity through judicial review mirrors the
active supervision path. The judicial review path also requires
states to adopt federal law and implement federal policy. In addition, a state must create a private right of action to prevent
enforcement of occupational licensing laws.160 Judicial review of
the licensing requirement must be de novo, and may not rely on
“hypothetical risks to public safety” to justify the licensure
law.161
II. THE EXTENT OF BOARD EXPOSURE UNDER NORTH
CAROLINA DENTAL AND THE EFFICACY OF RESCUE
LEGISLATION
After North Carolina Dental was decided, state boards
moved from presumed antitrust immunity to potential liability
for any market-sensitive act.162 However, given the scope of the
legislative and executive response to this increased litigation
risk, it is worth examining whether the litigation risk facing
state boards is substantial enough to justify such a reactionary
outpour. After reviewing the risk posed to states, state boards,
and individual board members, this Part will survey litigation
that has followed North Carolina Dental to date in order to establish a preliminary sense of the legal risk states now bear. After concluding that the litigation risk is too great to go unaddressed by states, this Part will next argue that both federal
and state legislative responses seeking to limit board liability
are insufficient, and that a new approach must be sought.

157. See id. §§ 5(c)(2)–(3) (describing the duties of the office, as well as the
internal review procedures).
158. Id. § 5(c)(5).
159. Id. § 5(c)(5)(B).
160. Id. § 6(b)(1)(C).
161. Id. § 6(b)(2).
162. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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A. DEFINING THE TRUE RISK TO STATE BOARDS POST-NORTH
CAROLINA DENTAL
North Carolina Dental raises difficult questions of whether
and to what extent state licensing board members are covered
by state indemnification regimes, which in many states are designed only to cover more limited risk of liability attaching to due
process lawsuits. Prior to North Carolina Dental, state licensing
boards already shouldered substantial litigation risk. Licensing
boards are regularly sued on due process grounds by applicants
denied licensure.163 However, antitrust lawsuits are different
than due process suits in several respects. First, and perhaps
most relevant to state legislators seeking to protect legal defense
funds from drainage, antitrust liability under the Sherman Act
carries treble damages.164 This was not at issue in North Carolina Dental because plaintiffs were seeking only an injunction,
and no monetary damages.165 Second, antitrust lawsuits are often highly complex and technical, sometimes involving analysis
of economic impacts that require expert testimony in a way that
due process claims do not.166 Antitrust lawsuits are costly to litigate, even when favorably resolved.167
Part of the reason the response to North Carolina Dental
has been so substantial may be the sheer number of boards the

163. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (challenging the decision of a state medical board on Due Process grounds); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973) (challenging the decision of state board of optometry on Due
Process grounds); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470
U.S. 373 (1985) (challenging denial of membership in American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons on Due Process grounds).
164. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
165. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015).
166. See Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in the Battle of Experts, 106 NW. L. REV. 1261 (2012)
(discussing the cost and complexity of expert witness testimony in antitrust litigation).
167. In 2017, antitrust and securities litigation combined to make up
twenty-one percent of all class action defense spending, despite the fact that
antitrust suits are relatively uncommon. CARLTON FIELDS, THE 2018 CARLTON
FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN REDUCING COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 7 (2018), https://classactionsurvey
.com/pdf/2018-class-action-survey.pdf. In 2017, antitrust litigation constituted
12.6% of all corporate class action defense matters, but accounted for 13.5% of
spending. Id. Other than consumer fraud, no other type of class action defense
carried such a disparity between cost of defense and frequency of litigation. Id.
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decision impacts.168 In 2017, there were 1790 active state licensing boards.169 Almost by definition, licensing boards act to restrict access to the market for some providers. Depending on
facts and circumstances, this may be an anticompetitive act subject to liability under the Sherman Act. Even in cases where no
liability is found, the hassle and expense of litigating antitrust
challenges are substantial. In a recent antitrust case filed
against a state board of medical examiners in which the board
was ultimately found not liable, the cost of defending the suit
was hundreds of thousands of dollars.170
Further, under the Sherman Act, antitrust liability attaches
whenever there is an unreasonable restriction of trade, even if
the board’s action does not eliminate competition, as it did in
North Carolina Dental.171 Given the nature of the board’s regulatory function, if boards are unable to satisfy the clearly articulated policy and active supervision requirements of Midcal,
much of the board’s activity will be effectively hamstrung by antitrust law.172
The litigation risk discussed above in the context of board
liability is further exacerbated when considered in the context of
board members being sued in their individual capacity. The vast
majority of antitrust suits against state boards filed since North
Carolina Dental have named board members in their individual
capacities, seeking damages.173 Defendants in North Carolina
Dental argued that imposing antitrust liability on state licensing
boards would create a disincentive to private citizens to serve on
boards.174 The Court dismissed this concern on the basis that
most individual board members are indemnified by the state,
168. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1571 (opining that, because pre-North
Carolina Dental supervision of licensing boards was threadbare in many states,
and because active market participants “control almost every board,” the monetary risk to states under North Carolina Dental is substantial).
169. Id. at 1570.
170. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 37 (additional
written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (citing summary judgement decision in favor of the Virginia Board of Medicine, affirmed by the Fourth Circuit
in Petrie v. Virginia Board of Medicine, 648 F. App’x 352 (4th Cir. 2016)).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
172. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1980).
173. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 36 (additional
written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (“[A]t least two-thirds of the dozens
of antitrust cases that have been brought against state licensing boards following North Carolina Dental have also named as defendants board members in
their official and individual capacities and requested damages from them.”).
174. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1115 (2015).
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and because no monetary damages were sought in North Carolina Dental.175 While antitrust suits brought by government
agencies are unlikely to seek damages against individual board
members, private plaintiffs suing state licensing boards are able
and likely to seek treble damages against individual board members.176
The aftermath of North Carolina Dental has demonstrated
that the Court’s dismissive treatment of individual board member liability failed to take full account of the ways in which state
indemnification regimes interact with treble damages sought
under federal antitrust laws. Many states cap indemnification
funding at a certain dollar amount, or refuse to indemnify defendants against punitive damages.177 As noted above, the uncertain application of Florida’s indemnification scheme to antitrust damages caused two board members to resign.178
Similarly, California’s indemnification statute for state government employees is uncertain to shield board members from
individual liability. The Government Claims Act, like many
state statutes, does not indemnify litigants against punitive
damages.179 Whether treble damages constitute punitive damages for which board members may not seek indemnification is
an open question. Although the California Attorney General has
opined that treble damages do not constitute punitive damages
within the meaning of the Government Claims Act, this represents yet another unresolved question that California and states
with similar caps on indemnification must navigate in the postNorth Carolina Dental legal landscape.180
175. Id. at 1115–16.
176. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1590 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 791–92 (1975) (remanding case to allow private plaintiffs to seek
treble damages against members of state bar association)); John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of the Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 292
(2003) (explaining that individual members of public/private hybrid offices are
subject to “the whole panoply of antitrust remedies”).
177. State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity
-and-tort-liability.aspx (last updated Oct. 14, 2010) (noting that thirty-three
states statutorily limit the amount of damages that may be paid by the state);
see also Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 15–18 (questioning whether treble
damages constitute punitive damages and thus whether the state must pay
them); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 1–3, 12, and 16 and accompanying text.
179. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 818 (West 2018).
180. See Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6; supra note 6 and accompanying
text.

452

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:425

Finally, even where board members do have a right to indemnification, there is no right to exculpation.181 The time taken
by litigation, the stress attached to being named as a defendant,
and the potential personal privacy cost of discovery are all strong
disincentives to professionals serving on state licensing boards.
These concerns are not theoretical; in a 2016 case brought
against the Virginia Board of Medicine, each of the five board
members named in the suit faced deposition and were required
to produce private information regarding their professional practice and personal finances.182
By any account, the Court’s decision in North Carolina Dental gave rise to a flood of litigation against state boards and their
individual members. This liability risk is exacerbated by treble
damages and the uncertain application of indemnification
schemes.183 The effects of North Carolina Dental have proved
far-reaching and are unlikely to subside in the near future, absent legislative intervention.
B. OVERVIEW OF POST-NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL LITIGATION
AGAINST STATE LICENSING BOARDS
Perhaps the best indication of the scope of risk that follows
from North Carolina Dental can be gleaned from an overview of
litigation that has occurred since the Supreme Court issued the
decision in 2015.184 Since that time, suits have been filed in at

181. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 7 (written
statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (describing methods for achieving immunity for board members).
182. Id. at 37 (additional written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen).
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); supra note 16 and accompanying text.
184. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1579–82, for a broad synthesis of the
antitrust litigation spawned by North Carolina Dental, describing suppression
of innovative practices, unreasonable and unfair entry barriers, and scope-ofpractice challenges as the three major categories of litigation against state licensure boards.
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least nine states including Arizona,185 California,186 Connecticut,187 Georgia,188 Indiana,189 Louisiana,190 Missouri,191 Nevada,192 North Carolina,193 Pennsylvania,194 Texas,195 and the
District of Puerto Rico.196 State board antitrust challenges have
been heard by the Third,197 Fourth,198 Fifth,199 Ninth,200 and
Tenth Circuits.201 This list does not purport to be comprehensive,
but is intended to give some indication of the scope of litigation
185. SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 499 (2017).
186. Gonzales v. Dep’t of Real Estate, No. 2:15-cv-2448 GEB GGH PS, 2017
WL 2464515, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted
by No. 2:15-cv-2448 GEB GGH PS, 2017 WL 3953893 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017).
187. Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn.
2016).
188. Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment, & Injunctive Relief,
Julien v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, No. 1:17-cv-04045-AT, 2017 WL 4583234, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2017); Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-cv-02843-SCJ, 2016 WL
4258930, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2016).
189. Prime Healthcare Servs.-Monroe, LLC. v. Ind. Univ. Health Bloomington, No. 1:16-cv-00003-RLY-DKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136474, at *1 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 30, 2016).
190. Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326, 326 (5th Cir. 2016),
cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2162 (2017) (denying nursing student’s antitrust claim
against state board after the board terminated a university’s nursing program,
and holding that the “district court was not required to determine whether the
policy was actively supervised by the state in evaluating the board’s claim for
sovereign immunity”).
191. Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n, No. 4:15-cv-1432 HEA,
2016 WL 5846825, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2016).
192. Strategic Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:16-cv171-RFB-VCF, 2016 WL 3002370, at *1 (D. Nev. May 24, 2016) (dismissing action without prejudice as a result of settlement requiring legislative action).
193. Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-CV-59-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23570, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2017).
194. Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 188 F. Supp. 3d 510 (W.D.
Pa. 2016).
195. Allibone v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. A-17-CA-00064-SS, 2017 WL 4768224, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Oct 20, 2017); Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 453 S.W.3d 606 (W.D.
Tex. 2016).
196. Rivera-Nazario v. Corporacion del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, No. CV
14-1533, 2015 WL 9484490, at *1 (D.P.R. Dec. 29, 2015).
197. See Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d
567 (3d Cir. 2017).
198. Petrie v. Va. Bd. of Med., 648 F. App’x 352 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 137 S.
Ct. 524 (2016).
199. Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2016).
200. SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.,
859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2017).
201. Auraria Student Hous. v. Campus Vill. Apartments, 843 F.3d 1225
(10th Cir. 2016).
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that has followed in the wake of North Carolina Dental. However, commentators suggest that the litigation risk indicated by
litigation to date may grossly understate the true liability facing
boards across the country.202
Despite the extensive litigation that has followed North Carolina Dental, common law is unlikely to provide an adequate solution to state board antitrust liability. Litigation has failed to
produce general principles at common law in part because the
issues in these cases are too diverse to create coherent, broadly
applicable common law doctrine.203 State licensing boards regulate a wide variety of professions, and perform a multitude of
regulatory functions.204 As a result, the issues presented in the
post-North Carolina Dental cases to date are too wide ranging to
begin coalescing around tidy common law principles.205
An additional reason for pursuing a legislative, rather than
common law solution is that as litigants continue to test the contours of North Carolina Dental in court, the litigation costs will
continue to strain state legal defense funds.206 Defendants in litigation following from North Carolina Dental are—of necessity—
state bodies, dependent on taxpayer support to defend themselves. Reliance upon common law to provide answers to the ambiguities of North Carolina Dental therefore places a heavy fiscal
burden on states, and diverts resources from other areas of public concern.207
202. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1580 (“[F ] or every board that has been
sued, there are more than one hundred others that are potentially vulnerable.”).
203. Compare Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 326 (considering the antitrust liability of a state medical board after the board terminated a nursing program from
which petitioner had graduated), with Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer
Exam’rs, 188 F. Supp. 3d 510 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (considering the antitrust liability
of the Pennsylvania State Board of Auctioneers for imposing citations and fines
on an attorney who auctioned toy trains on the internet).
204. E.g., List of Iowa Boards and Commissions, IOWA.GOV, https://openup
.iowa.gov/boardlist (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (listing over 200 boards, commissions, and councils, including professional boards managing podiatry, speech
pathology, barbering, and message therapy).
205. Compare Allibone v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. A-17-CA-00064-SS, 2017 WL
4768224 (W.D. Tex., Oct 20, 2017) (brought because of discriminatory practices
favoring one form of medical practice over another), with Strategic Pharm. Sols.,
Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:16-cv-171-RFB-VCF, 2016 WL
3002370 (brought because the board was promoting a monopoly).
206. Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and
Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1174–75 (2016) (showing that in instances of lawsuits brought against local law enforcement agencies, defending
jurisdictions in some instances have to draw the funds from its general fund).
207. Id.
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Finally, in many respects, the twisted path of the common
law is what created this confused and confusing state of antitrust law in the first place. As noted above, judicial expansion of
the Commerce Clause expanded the reach of the Sherman Act
far beyond the intent of the enacting Congress.208 In response,
the Court created state action immunity in order to shield states
from antitrust lability.209 North Carolina Dental represents the
latest iteration of the Court’s definition of state action immunity—a strain of jurisprudence itself a testament to the ill-fitting
application of antitrust law to public regulatory action.210 The
result of this judge-made law culminating in North Carolina
Dental essentially imposes a procedural requirement—states
must review and affirmatively adopt the decisions of state
boards in order to shield the decisions from antitrust liability—
but should the state fail to faithfully exercise this mandated process, the board and its individual members bear antitrust liability and potential treble damages.211 If this is where the common
law has led us, it is perhaps time for a clear and well-considered
statutory scheme to lead us out.
C. FAILURES OF THE RESTORING BOARD IMMUNITY ACT OF 2017
For the reasons outlined below, federal and state responses
to North Carolina Dental proposed to date are insufficient. The
RBI Act is both inadequate and overbroad in its approach. While
there are instances of states facilitating careful administrative
review according to procedures likely to satisfy Midcal’s second
prong,212 there is no guarantee that state legislation will satisfy
the Court’s ill-defined active supervision requirement. A solution
to federal antitrust liability dependent on state statutes is less
certain than a federal solution, and may still lead to excess and
expensive litigation as a result.
The RBI Act paints with too broad a brush, failing to differentiate between the many occupations regulated by boards, and

208. See supra Part I.C.1.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(expanding the reach of the Commerce Clause).
209. See supra notes 71, 76–77, 89, 94–99 and accompanying text.
210. The Supreme Court acknowledged this ill fit in Parker, holding that the
Sherman Act is intended to guard against individual private action, but not
state action. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (providing for treble damages).
212. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (stating the second prong is that the state must actively supervise the
actor charged with executing the policy).
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fails to hit its target, offering the carrot of immunity without addressing the Court’s underlying concerns regarding boards’ anticompetitive actions.213 The RBI Act applies only to licensure,
and fails to address a myriad other board functions which may
have anticompetitive effects that should be weighed and balanced. In this sense, the RBI Act simultaneously does too
much—imposing a federal regulatory agenda over the top of existing state statutes and regulations—and not enough, by failing
to address nuances of the very different industries that licensing
boards regulate.
1. The Restoring Board Immunity Act Addresses Only
Licensing Activity
As discussed above, occupational licensing boards possess
regulatory responsibilities for occupations within each state that
expand far beyond the act of licensing.214 Under the facts of
North Carolina Dental, licensure was not explicitly at issue.215
Rather, the Board made a determination that the practice of dentistry included teeth whitening and issued cease and desist letters to non-dentists offering this service.216 While the RBI Act
may encapsulate this situation by mandating that licensing laws
be narrowly enforced against occupations “that are included explicitly in the statute or regulation that defines the occupation’s
scope of practice,”217 the bulk of the bill is aimed at acts of licensing and reducing licensure requirements.218 Other board actions,
such as regulating advertisements, disciplinary proceedings,
and other common duties of boards, receive neither legislative
guidance nor immunity under the RBI Act. This gap leaves
states with a great deal of antitrust liability.
Neither can the RBI Act claim to shield states from all licensing-related liability. Indeed, much of the litigation outlined
above may not be prevented by the immunity offered to states
under the RBI Act. Take for example the Texas telemedicine provider who sued the State Board of Medicine in 2015, shortly after
North Carolina Dental was issued. The telemedicine provider
213. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Part I.A.
215. N.C. Dental State Bd. of Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015).
216. Id.
217. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. § 5(b)(3) (2017).
218. Immunity under the bill “shall not apply to an action unrelated to regulating the personal qualifications required to engage in or practice a lawful
occupation.” Id. § 4(d).
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disputed the validity of the Board’s rule that a doctor-patient relationship can only be established via an in-person meeting.219
This rule effectively keeps telemedicine providers out of the market—a restriction of trade that implicates antitrust concerns.
However, the RBI Act only addresses licensure, not Board regulations that function to constrain competition. It is unclear that
the RBI Act, even if enacted and adopted by the State of Texas,
would provide the Board of Medicine with any legal cover whatsoever in challenges of this variety.220
2. The Restoring Board Immunity Act Likely Carries High
Implementation Costs and Arbitrary Alternations to State
Statutes
States like Colorado, discussed above, already have a supervisory agency overseeing the work and decisions of occupational
boards.221 DORA has successfully kept licensure requirements
relatively low across the State,222 balancing the importance of an
unrestricted economy with health and safety considerations for
Colorado residents. Overhauling this system, or even adapting
it to conform to the RBI Act’s conception of an Office of Supervision of Occupational Boards,223 places form over function, and
creates redundancy between state and federal government.
Colorado is not alone in having an existing infrastructure
that would require substantial renovation in order to comply
with the RBI Act.224 This is due in part to the particularities of
the Act—for example, the stipulation that occupational licensing

219. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 111–13, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd.,
No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2015), 2015 WL 4387362; see also 2015
Tex. Reg. 485 (Feb. 6, 2015) (specifying that communications via email, text,
chat, or phone are inadequate to establish a doctor-patient relationship—a prerequisite to issuing prescriptions).
220. See H.R. 3446 § 4(d) (“[I]mmunity . . . shall not apply to an action unrelated to regulating the personal qualifications required to engage in or practice
a lawful occupation, such as rules of an occupational licensing board governing
minimum prices or residency requirements.”).
221. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-102 (2016).
222. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 47,
at 26 (showing that the average required education or experience for licensure
in Colorado is similar or lower than the majority of states).
223. See H.R. 3446 § 5(c).
224. See supra notes 127–31, 139 and accompanying text (discussing the licensing infrastructure of Connecticut, Georgia, and California, respectively).
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boards cannot receive immunity under the Act unless a minimum of two-thirds of the members are appointed by an elected
member of the state.225
In addition, much of what state licensing boards do is ministerial and administrative in nature. Requiring boards to submit even non-discretionary decisions to an Office of Supervision
of Occupational Boards creates unnecessary review carrying a
greater public cost of funding the Office. This also delays licensing decisions, which negatively impacts even successful applicants.226
Similarly, when a licensing board files suit against an individual to enjoin an unlicensed person from practicing a regulated
profession, submitting the decision to an Office of Supervision is
a redundant procedural step. Filing a lawsuit rarely carries antitrust liability.227 When a lawsuit is initiated, the court, a sovereign state body,228 makes the ultimate decision regarding any
anticompetitive action, and not the non-sovereign board.229
Seeking the approval of a sovereign state actor (the Office of Supervision) in order to submit the decision to a second sovereign
state actor (the state court) is cumbersome, unnecessary, and
likely to create “bureaucratic ossification” without producing
meaningful review of self-interested boards.230
Variation in regulatory practices among states is arguably a
positive element of occupational regulation. States have freedom
to experiment, to seek innovation, or to adopt a policy of stricter
consumer protection—policy preferences that can peak and ebb
with the politically elected officials of a state.231 States with
225. Id. § 3(8)(c).
226. Contra COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 133, at 3
(documenting the Department’s progress toward its goal of reducing licensing
processing time by one-third).
227. See FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34, at 6 (explaining that filing a
lawsuit is only susceptible to an antitrust challenge if it falls within the “sham
exception”); WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 20–21 (explaining that filing suit
rarely triggers antitrust exposure because the ultimate decision about the defendant’s fitness to participate in the market is rendered by the court, a true
state actor, insulating the board from antitrust liability).
228. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 575–80 (1984) (holding that decisions of a state supreme court are sovereign state actions not subject to scrutiny
under the Sherman Act).
229. Id. at 574 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)).
230. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1602.
231. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (advocating for federalism, as it provides
for “unit[s] of decision making” that are at once large enough to adequately
measure the costs and benefits, while small enough that there is minimal risk
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space to experiment with regulatory practices are more nimble
than a centrally controlled federal system, and are able to piece
together regulatory systems best suited to a particular state.232
3. The Restoring Board Immunity Act May Disincentivize
Board Consideration of Competitive Impacts of Official Action
by Granting Blanket Immunity
Vigorous competition promotes consumer interests by driving down prices, increasing quality, and promoting the availability of goods and services.233 Incentivizing states and state regulatory boards to remain watchful of the competitive
consequences of their actions is therefore desirable. Granting
blanket immunity to boards may create an environment in which
supervisory and review functions are mechanically carried out
without reviewing the substance of the decision or the true restrictive impacts of the decision. Creating a system in which regulatory boards have guidance in crafting and executing an effective supervisory program, with the continued threat of antitrust
liability if the program is not faithfully executed, is likely a
greater service to consumers than an iron clad grant of immunity.
D. FAILURES OF STATE LEGISLATION
The obvious downside of turning to states to solve the liability problems posed by North Carolina Dental is that the validity
of state statutes is unpredictable. While the U.S. Congress may
enact legislation that effectively amends the Sherman Act by
creating a carve-out for state regulatory boards following certain
requirements, state legislators do not have the ability to amend
federal law. States may statutorily implement supervisory procedures that seem likely to satisfy the Court’s active supervision
requirement. However, states are working to create a defense to
the Sherman Act—a federal cause of action.234 A state-level statutory immunity defense to a federal cause of action creates a
to the central government).
232. Id. at 1608 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”)); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 LAW J. & ECON. 23, 34–35 (1983) (describing the value of competition
among diverse jurisdictions).
233. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34, at 2.
234. See, e.g., Robert Eisig Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond
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mismatch. States cannot rewrite or supersede federal law, and
where state regulatory processes violate federal antitrust law,
federal law controls.235
Even if states pass statutes authorizing supervisory agencies and they comply with the Court’s active supervision requirement, the uncertainty of whether the supervisory provisions are
sufficient still invites litigation. In this way, passing state legislation does not keep states from being dragged into court on
North Carolina Dental grounds. Even the most carefully crafted
state statute, while it may remove liability, may still be challenged. The inefficiency of all fifty states independently crafting
and enacting legislation, then defending in court the capacity of
the supervisory structures to provide sufficient state supervision, cannot be the best option. Instead, a more cooperative
model is needed—one that strikes a balance between the overreaching blanket policies of the proposed federal legislation, and
the state solutions that have been proposed to date.
III. COOPERATIVE LEGISLATION: OUTLINING
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE MODEL
STATUTE
Working from the conclusion that federal and state legislative responses to North Carolina Dental to date have been either
inappropriate or insufficient to address the litigation risk facing
state licensing boards, the following Section outlines elements of
a possible solution. This recommendation does not pretend to be
comprehensive, but is intended merely as a starting point for
structuring a federal/state collaboration to achieve the best results for consumers and states. Factors relevant to the recommendations that follow include: providing for consumer health
and safety; promoting economic competition; cost of implementation; reducing duplicative legislation; and bringing predictability to states’ antitrust liability.

Immunity, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1829, 1867 n.200 (describing one method of combating claims of antitrust at the municipal level is to argue for deference to the
action because it serves the greater good).
235. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires this result. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. State laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Because the Sherman
Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce” is illegal, state laws holding the Sherman Act inapplicable
in certain circumstances may be challenged on preemption grounds. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012).
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Unlike state statutes, federal legislation has the distinct advantage of possessing the authority to amend current federal
law. Federal lawmakers have clear authority to draft federal antitrust legislation, even if the result essentially amends the
Sherman Act, or supplants Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Sherman Act.236 The obvious drawback of legislating at
the federal level is the difficulty of creating a federal framework
sufficiently nuanced to address the regulatory and licensing
function of occupational boards across the United States. To
combine the authority of federal legislation and the nimbler nature of state legislation, this Part recommends cooperative legislation between states and the federal government. In this way,
Congress can lend its federal authority to states, while also empowering states to utilize existing state statutory structures to
address gaps in board oversight.
The federal component of this recommendation has two
prongs. First, this Part envisions stand-alone federal legislation
with no required action by states. Second, the legislation would
create exemptions from antitrust liability for state boards compliant with certain federal objectives.
A. STAND-ALONE FEDERAL LEGISLATION: A REMEDY FOR
INDIVIDUAL BOARD MEMBER LIABILITY
A key weakness of the RBI Act is its blanket treatment of
discrete issues. However, there are two issues that arose in the
wake of North Carolina Dental that are appropriate for sweeping
federal legislation. The first is board members’ personal liability;
the second is the composition of supervisory bodies responsible
for active supervision.
First, federal legislation may be employed to provide blanket exculpation of individual board members. As discussed
above, many state indemnification statutes do not provide reimbursement for punitive damages.237 Others cap indemnification
beyond a specified dollar amount.238 Treble damages in antitrust
suits create a particular problem in this respect. A new federal
bill would follow the model of 15 U.S.C. § 35, which provides that
damages recovered under the Clayton Act cannot be recovered

236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate commerce between states).
237. See supra notes 12–13, 177 and accompanying text.
238. See Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 15–18; see also supra note 177
and accompanying text.
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from local governments.239 Similarly, a new federal bill should
provide that antitrust damages awarded against state licensing
boards cannot be recovered against individual board members in
their personal capacities.
Although this type of exculpation provision might appear to
incentivize individual board members to engage in anticompetitive behavior without fear of repercussion, such fears may be allayed by institutional controls over licensing boards. Irrespective
of individual board members’ liability, antitrust lawsuits will remain costly for states defending their boards, because the state
itself may still be held liable. This cost strongly incentivizes
states to carefully train board members to assess the anticompetitive effects of board decisions. States are also incentivized to
identify and dismiss individual bad actors serving on state
boards. Further, the continued litigation risk for states encourages careful scrutiny of board decisions by state supervisory bodies, as required by Midcal and affirmed by North Carolina Dental.240
Further, as North Carolina Dental makes clear, antitrust
immunity is premised on the adequacy of the state’s supervision
over the board.241 It is a non sequitur to suggest that boards
should not be engaging in anticompetitive conduct in the first
place so as not to require immunity under Parker—the core function of licensing boards is to make regulatory decisions that restrict some providers from entering the market.242 To say that
licensing boards should not engage in anticompetitive conduct is
to say that licensing boards should not give effect to their statutorily mandated purpose.243 Antitrust liability, in the context of
licensing boards, hinges not on anticompetitive behavior, but on
239. E.g., Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 10 (testimony of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (presenting the notion that a statute similar to
15 U.S.C. § 35 could work for indemnifying board members against antitrust
challenges).
240. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (2015);
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 97–98
(1980).
241. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1105.
242. Justice Scalia probed this issue at Oral Argument, asking “[w]hat . . . is
a more obvious restriction of competition than preventing somebody from competing? . . . It seems to me [licensing and standard setting] . . . both involve anticompetitive decisions.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, N.C. Dental, 135 S.
Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534).
243. See supra Part I.A. (explaining that boards are statutorily charged with
regulating markets for the purpose of safeguarding consumer health and
safety).
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the adequacy of state supervision. Ensuring that individual
board members are indemnified from personal liability does not
distort individual incentives, but right-sizes liability by ensuring
that only actors with the ability to reasonably avoid antitrust
liability bear any litigation risk.
Moving next to the question of what form of state body is
required to perform supervisory functions, federal law may also
provide a clean, certain solution. As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s guidance on this question leaves states with a
great deal of ambiguity.244 State legislatures and state supreme
courts act with sufficient “Stateness” to trigger state action immunity.245 Cities and municipalities, by contrast, do not act with
sufficient “Stateness,” and may only displace competition when
acting in accordance with a clearly articulated state policy,
though active supervision is not required.246 The Supreme Court
has never specifically addressed whether traditional state agencies act with sufficient “Stateness”—all that has been said is that
state agencies dominated by active market participants are not
sufficiently sovereign.247
To resolve this ambiguity and head off further litigation on
this issue without upsetting the common law scheme, Congress
should acknowledge that traditional state agencies are sufficiently sovereign to supervise licensing boards and to adopt decisions of boards on behalf of the state. As discussed above, failure to recognize the capacity of traditional state agencies to
perform this function would lead to impractical results.248 Congress may define traditional state agencies using various characteristics, but in order to preserve the current state of common
law, Congress may dictate that a traditional state agency is one
comprised entirely, or almost entirely, of full-time employees of
the state.
B. FEDERAL ENDORSEMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION
There are two major hurdles facing states attempting to
comply with North Carolina Dental. First, states must determine what sort of government body acts with sufficient
“Stateness” to trigger state action immunity. Second, states
must determine what processes and procedures satisfy the active
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See Allensworth, supra note 68.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985).
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106.
See supra Part II.C.2.

464

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:425

supervision requirement. The federal government imposes these
requirements through the Sherman Act, and the federal government has the power to clarify what is necessary for their fulfillment.249 While blanket federal legislation may be effectively applied to address the composition of the supervising body, as
discussed above, a more flexible approach is required to define
the procedures constituting adequate supervision.
Rather than the prescriptive requirements of the RBI Act,
this Section recommends a flexible federal statute that endorses
state legislation. While this type of cooperative legislation is perhaps nontraditional, it is not without precedent. In the insurance
context, for example, the federal government has introduced a
host of legislative tools to assist states in developing their own
standards, rather than imposing federal standards.250
One possible model is the 1990 Medicare supplement legislation, in which Congress permitted states to develop standards
for Medicare supplement policies.251 State standard drafting was
guided by regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHS).252 This type of federal/state
partnership could be effectively duplicated in the context of occupational licensing, with states following the direction of FTC
guidance documents. Helpfully, the FTC has already promulgated extensive guidance to states seeking to comply with North
Carolina Dental’s active supervision requirement.253 The FTC
could expand upon and formalize this guidance, mirroring DHS’s
guidance of state policy design.
Borrowing statutory models from the insurance context can
also help to overcome the efficiency problems inherent in fifty
separate states working independently to define a supervisory
system that will stand up to Midcal’s active supervision requirement. Under a recent legislative proposal, the Federal Insurance
Office would evaluate state regulatory standards, identify best

249. Admittedly, it is the Supreme Court that technically imposes these requirements through the development of the state action immunity doctrine.
However, this doctrine is a safe harbor from the reach of the Sherman Act—a
federal statute adopted by the legislature.
250. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE
AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
8 (2013).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34.
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practices based on a consensus of the states, then use the collected data to promulgate national targets.254 This model could
be effectively applied in the context of occupational licensing,
again with the FTC playing a central role. The FTC’s Bureau of
Protection could take stock of the supervisory structures and
procedures employed by states, and promulgate best practices
based on the results. While such targets are nonbinding, this exercise would help to create greater uniformity in licensing review
procedures between states, and would provide guidance to states
seeking to substantially restructure their licensing laws to conform with the current legal landscape.255
Another potential model for federal/state cooperative legislation is the State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency
Act (SMART Act), introduced in 2004.256 The SMART Act as proposed would have allowed states to develop their own insurance
reform standards, and exempted states from federal requirements as long as the state’s scheme satisfied certain federal objectives.257 Where federal objectives were not satisfied by the
state’s standards, this exemption would not apply, leading state
law to be preempted by federal law.258 This same model could be
effectively applied to state licensing boards. Rather than the RBI
Act, Congress could pass a federal statute prescribing mandatory supervision requirements, which applies only when states’
supervisory structures fail to meet certain requirements. This
would preserve the existing structure of state law, while also restoring antitrust immunity to state licensing boards.
By utilizing existing or previously proposed models of cooperative legislation between federal and state governments, the
challenges posed by North Carolina Dental may be addressed in
a way that is non-duplicative, streamlined, and substantially reduces the uncertainty currently being worked out through litigation, rather than legislation.

254. See id. (discussing this system as a “national passport approach”); see
also FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 250, at 9.
255. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1608 (discussing the potential benefits
to be derived from states looking to the review procedures of other states to
create a statutory scheme capable of fulfilling Midcal’s active supervision requirement).
256. See FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 250.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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CONCLUSION
North Carolina Dental created substantial liability for state
occupational licensing boards across the country. Because licensing boards are granted authority to regulate occupations, and
because the exercise of that authority very often entails anticompetitive results, North Carolina Dental is in many ways a liability trap for states. Recognizing this, state and federal lawmakers
have sought ways to address the liability born by states and individual board members under North Carolina Dental. Legislative responses to date are insufficient to address the litigation
chasm opened by the Supreme Court.
This Note has attempted to sketch a possible solution
through a federal/state legislative partnership, lending the authority of federal legislation to state lawmakers and seeking to
leverage preexisting state statutes to create an efficient answer
to occupational board antitrust liability. Developing a cooperative framework between federal and state lawmakers may provide a solution that reduces litigation, improves board awareness of the competitive impacts of their decisions, and does not
necessitate a complete overhaul of existing state law. The solution proposed here seeks to create a flexible statutory framework
aimed at addressing the uncertainty that has followed in the
wake of North Carolina Dental, without allowing federal legislation with ulterior motivations to substantially overhaul state
law.

